The Effectiveness of the World Bank\u27s Anti-Corruption Efforts: Current Legal and Structural Obstacles and Uncertainties by Chanda, Parthapratim
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 
Volume 32 
Number 2 Spring Article 6 
April 2020 
The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anti-Corruption Efforts: 
Current Legal and Structural Obstacles and Uncertainties 
Parthapratim Chanda 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp 
Recommended Citation 
Parthapratim Chanda, The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anti-Corruption Efforts: Current Legal and 
Structural Obstacles and Uncertainties, 32 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 315 (2004). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For 
more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE WORLD BANK'S ANTI-
CORRUPTION EFFORTS:
CURRENT LEGAL AND STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES AND
UNCERTAINTIES
Parthapratim Chanda*
I. INTRODUCTION
Corruption is widely considered the single most severe impediment to
development and growth in developing countries.' Corruption in developing
countries is not simply a domestic problem, but often involves a variety of actors
within and outside of developing countries. Curbing cross-border, or transnational,
corruption through legal channels raises unique legal and administrative issues of
jurisdiction, investigative cooperation and conflict of laws that may not exist in
purely domestic anti-corruption efforts. These issues have led to numerous
multilateral efforts to control transnational corruption, including the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, 2 the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 3 and
the United Nations Convention against Corruption,4 all of which require countries
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1. Cheryl W Gray & Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption and Development, FINANCE AND
DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1998, at 7. ("In recent survey of more than 150 high-ranking public officials
and key members of civil society from more than 60 developing countries, the respondents ranked
public sector corruption as the most severe impediment to development and growth in their countries.").
2. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-43 (1997), 37 I.L.M. I (1998), available at
http://oecd.org/dataoecd/41/242031210.pdf (last visited Feb, 8, 2004) [hereinafter OECD Convention].
3. Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-39
(1996), 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/English/Treaties/b-58.htm (last
visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention].
4. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/58/4 (2003), available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/notpubl/Corruption_E.pdf (last
visited Feb. 16, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
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to criminalize corrupt activity and urge cooperation between nations to investigate
and prosecute transnational corruption.5
In 1996, the World Bank 6 joined these multilateral efforts by publicly
announcing an institutional commitment to combat corruption within the World
Bank and within World Bank financed projects carried out by governments in the
developing world.7 Disbursing over $19 billion in loans per annum, the World
Bank is exposed to significant operational risk for corruption and fraud. For
example, Northwestern University political economist Jeffrey Winters estimates
that corruption diverted upwards of 30 percent of development funds lent to
Indonesia by the World Bank, totaling over $11 billion. 9 Several high-profile cases
involving multinational Western firms in World Bank financed projects confirm
the transnational nature of such corruption. In 2000, for example, the World Bank
suspended its support for a $100 million water project in Ghana awarded to a unit
of Enron Corporation, citing an unexplained $5 million payment by Enron.' 0
Additionally the World Bank raised objections to Enron projects in Nigeria, India
and Mozambique."
While a vast and developing literature attempts to define corruption and
address its causes and consequences, 12 the World Bank assigns its own meaning to
the terms "corruption" and "fraud" in its Procurement Guidelines and Consultant
Guidelines. The definitions set forth by the Bank in the Procurement Guidelines,
5. OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. 9; Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, at art.
11(2); U.N. Convention, supra note 4, at art. I.
6. For the purposes of this article, "World Bank" or "Bank" solely denotes the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development (1BRD), the largest organization under the World Bank Group
structure. See World Bank Group, About Us, Organization, Five Agenices, One Group, at
http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb, 16, 2004). The World Bank Group also includes the
International Finance Corporation, the International Development Association, the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Id.
7 WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: PROGRESS AT THE WORLD
BANK SINCE 1997 1 (2000) [hereinafter PROGRESS SINCE 1997].
8. 1 WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2002 8 (2002). Figure combines IBRD and IDA lending.
9 Jeffrey A. Winters, Criminal Debt, in REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK 101, 102 (Jonathan R.
Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002). See also Jane Perlez, Ahead of Re-election Run, Indonesia
President Is Chased by Corruption Complaints, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at 8 ("The concerns about
corruption come with many news reports this week that 20 percent of World Bank and other foreign
loans are siphoned off every year by the Indonesians.").
10. Justice Eyeing Enron in Bribe Probe, CBS News, Aug. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/08/20/national/printables519319.shtml (last visited, May 1,
2004).
Ii. John R. Wilke, Enron Criminal Probe Focuses On Alleged Corruption Abroad, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 5, 2002, at Al. See also Karen MacGregor, Acres Loses Appeal on Briber) Charge in Lesotho,
GLOBE AND MAIL, Aug. 18, 2003, at B3 (Acres International, Canadian multinational engineering
firm, lost an appeal of a conviction on bribery charges related to a World Bank financed water project).
12. See generally Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Corruption: A General Review with an Emphasis on the
Role of the World Bank, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 451, 453-59 (1997) (describing corruption from the
perspectives of economics, political science, law, sociology, public administration, and business);
David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign, 14 CONN. J. INT'L L. 455 (1999)
(proposing that current definitions of corruption may be over-inclusive).
VOL. 32:2
THE WORLD BANK'S ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
which are nearly identical to the Consultant Guidelines, are as follows:
(i) "corrupt practice" means the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any
thing of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement
process or in contract execution; and
(ii) "fraudulent practice" means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a
procurement process or the execution of a contract to the detriment of the
Borrower, and includes collusive practices among bidders (prior to or after bid
submission) designed to establish bid prices at artificial, non-competitive levels
and to deprive the Borrower of the benefits of free and open competition.
13
While the definition of corrupt practice does not explicitly prohibit outside
parties from corruptly influencing World Bank staff,14 the World Bank Staff rules
provide that "[s]taff members shall not accept in connection with their appointment
or service with the Organizations any remuneration, nor any benefit, favor or gift
of significant value from any such governments or other entities or persons ,,05
The Staff Rules further state that "[n]either a staff member nor a member of his
immediate family shall accept a direct financial interest in any Bank Group
transaction ,,6 The rules also define staff misconduct to include the "[m]isuse
of Bank Group funds or other public funds for private gain in connection with
Bank activities or employment, or abuse of position in the Bank for financial
gain." 17
In accordance with these provisions, the World Bank Sanctions Committee
carries out sanctions for violations of the Procurement Guidelines, Consultant
Guidelines and Staff Rules.iS Allegations of corruption or fraud are first
investigated by the Department of Institutional Integrity (INT), 19 an allegedly
independent office within the World Bank that reports directly to the President of
the Bank.20 If INT believes there is reasonably sufficient evidence of fraud or
13. World Bank, Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits, § 1.15(a) (1999),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Procurement
Guidelines]. See also World Bank, Guidelines: Selection and Employment of Consultants by World
Bank Borrowers, § 1.25(a) (1999), available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004)
[hereinafter Consultant Guidelines].
14. It is also unclear whether the term "public official" in the World Bank's definition of corrupt
practice includes World Bank staff members.
15. World Bank, Staff Manual, Staff Rules, § 0.01, Pnnciple 3.1(b) (1999) [hereinafter Staff
Rules].
16. Id. at § 3.01,17.01.
17. Id. at § 8.01,13.01(d).
18. World Bank Group, Sanctions Committee Procedures, § i(a)(3) (2001), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Sanctions Committee Procedures].
19. Id. at § 3(a).
20. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORLD BANK: MANAGEMENT CONTROLS STRONGER,
BUT CHALLENGES IN FIGHTING CORRUPTION REMAIN, GAO Doc. No. NSIAD-00-73, at 12 (2000)
(finding World Bank's Investigation Unit did not have the necessary independence from the Bank s
president. While reforms were subsequently undertaken by the World Bank to create a more
independent structure for investigations, it is unclear whether the GAO's conclusions have been
repudiated), available at http://www.gao.gov/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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corruption, it can refer the matter to the Sanctions Committee for punitive
measures.
2 1
The World Bank Staff Rules provide that "termination of service shall be
mandatory where it is determined that misuse of Bank funds or other public
funds for private gain in connection with Bank activities or employment, or abuse
of position in the Bank for financial gain" has occurred.22 The Procurement and
Consultant Guidelines include provisions allowing the World Bank to retract an
award or contract if a bidder has engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices in the
bidding or execution stages of the award or contract.23 The World Bank may also
declare a firm or individual ineligible, indefinitely or for a stated period of time, to
secure a Bank-financed contract. 24 Currently one hundred seventy-one firms and
individuals are debarred, either permanently or for specified periods of time, from
receiving World Bank-financed contracts.25 The Bank does not maintain a public
list of the names or the number of staff members who have been terminated for
26fraud and corruption.
Given its prominence in the world of development finance and its status as the
first development finance organization to implement a comprehensive anti-
corruption regime, the World Bank assumed a leadership position in the movement
to eliminate corruption from the field of international aid. Despite its successes,
however, significant legal and structural obstacles and uncertainties threaten the
effectiveness of the World Bank's anti-corruption efforts. This article analyzes a
number of these obstacles and uncertainties including the expansive due process
rights of employees and unclear procedural requirements imposed on the Bank
during criminal referrals, uncertainties surrounding the standard of proof in
internal corruption proceedings, the lack of a system of investigative cooperation
and cross-debarment and structural impediments arising out of the Bank's
operational model, governance structure, oversight capacity and staff incentives. In
the face of these obstacles and uncertainties, this article also offers
recommendations for the World Bank to improve its anti-corruption practices.
21. Sanctions Committee Procedures, supra note 18, at § 3(c).
22. Staff Rules, supra note 15, at § 8.01,1 4.01.
23. Procurement Guidelines, supra note 13, at §§ 1.15(b)-(c); Consultant Guidelines, supra note
13, at §§ 1.25(b)-(c).
24. Procurement Guidelines, supra note 13, at § I. i5(d); Consultant Guidelines, supra note 13, at
§ 1.25(d).
25. World Bank Group, Projects, Procurement, List of Debarred Firms, World Bank Listing of
Ineligible Firms: Fraud and Corruption, at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2004).
26. See World Bank Group, Preventing Corruption in World Bank Projects, at
http://wwwl .worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/preventing.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
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11. LEGAL OBSTACLES AND UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING CRIMINAL
REFERRALS OF ALLEGED CORRUPT ACTIVITY
A. Background to the Practice of Criminal Referrals at the World Bank
Criminal sanctions have traditionally been a part of the legal regime to
combat corruption in individual nations. 27 All of the major international
agreements against corruption require signatory governments to criminalize
corrupt activity 28 In the United States, criminal referral of corrupt activity to local
and federal prosecutors is an established tool for ensuring the integrity of those
institutions. 29 Following this bureaucratic norm, the World Bank began to refer
allegedly corrupt activity to national prosecutorial bodies.
In two 2002 cases, former World Bank employees pled guilty in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia to felony counts related to
corrupt activity they engaged in while employed at the World Bank.30 The U.S.
Department of Justice's prosecution of these two individuals was initiated via
criminal referrals from the World Bank's Legal Department.31 The cases also mark
the first two instances of employees of an international organization being
prosecuted under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In the first case, United States
v. Sengupta,32 the defendant, Gautam Sengupta, pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and to a second
count in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.33 The
World Bank employed Mr. Sengupta as a Task Manager in Washington D.C. from
1993 to 2000."4 "Task Managers are responsible for individual development
projects and as one of their duties ensure that proper feasibility studies are
27 Philip M. Nichols The Myth of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 627, 629 (2000) ("Bribery is universally condemned and is crimmalized by every country in
the world.").
28. See OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. I Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, at
art. II; U.N. Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1.
29. See Thomas E. Holliday & Charles J. Stevens, Disclosure of Results of Internal Investigations
to the Government or Other Third Parties, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 279, 283-92
(Brad D. Brian & Barry F McNeil eds., 2003) (noting disclosure of criminal activity is required of
certain highly regulated industnes and for companies dealing in secunties while other companies may
disclose voluntarily).
30. See A.B.A., WHITE COLLAR CRIME 2003 506-49 (2003) (providing the Plea Agreement and
Statement of Facts for both cases and the Information for United States v. Basu).
31. Glenn T. Ware, Lecture at Harvard Law School (Apr. 11, 2003) (presentation on file with
author).
32. Both the Plea Agreement and Statement of Facts for United States v. Sengupta were filed in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on January 30, 2002. A.B.A., supra note
30, at 506. 519.
33. A.B.A., supra note 30, at 506.
34. Id. at 519.
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completed for each proposed project., 35 In his role as Task Manager, Mr. Sengupta
entered into a scheme whereby he caused the awarding of four contracts to a
Swedish consultant in exchange for kickback payments totaling $127,000.36 For
one of the contracts, Mr. Sengupta assisted the Swedish consultant in wiring
$50,000 to a Kenyan official overseeing the implementation of a World Bank
project, with knowledge that the payment was a kickback,37 in violation of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.38
In the second case, United States v. Basu,39 the defendant, Ramendra Basu,
pled guilty to identical counts of conspiring to commit wire fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 371 and to violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 78dd-
403. Mr. Basu served as an officer in the Consultant Trust Funds Office at World
Bank headquarters in Washington, D.C. from 1996 to 2000, except for
approximately three months in late 1997 4i As a Trust Funds officer, the
defendant's duties included recommending consultants to Task Managers and
approving Task Managers' requests for Consultant Trust Funds. 42 In this capacity,
Mr. Basu met with the Swedish consultant and Mr. Sengupta and agreed to
"facilitate the payment of bribes" from the former to the latter.
43
In September 1997 Mr. Basu left his job at the World Bank and joined the
staff of the Swedish consulting firm and also secured employment there for his
father, brother-in-law, and a close friend. 44 At that time, Mr. Basu agreed to
receive ten percent of the value of all contracts that he worked on for the Swedish
consultant.45 By January 1998, the Swedish consultant had been awarded three
contracts by the World Bank Task Manager, Mr. Sengupta.46 In December 1997
Mr. Basu returned to his position at the World Bank, though he continued to
perform work on World Bank contracts with the Swedish consultant and continued
to receive compensation for his services.47 Furthermore, Mr. Basu also played a
role in facilitating the corrupt payment of $50,000 to a Kenyan government
official, providing the bank account number of a Kenyan firm to whom the
35. Id.
36. Id. at 521-22.
37. Id.
38. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l-78ff (2000) (although the defendant was convicted of aiding in the
bribery of foreign official, the 1998 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act extend the
designation of foreign official to include officials of public international organizations. This amendment
extends the reach of the act to now include corrupt activity between corrupt actors and World Bank staff
regardless of whether a government official in a developing country is involved).
39. The Information for United States v. Basu was filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia on November 26, 2002. A.B.A., supra note 30, at 525. The Plea Agreement and
Statement of facts were filed on December 17 2002. Id. at 533, 545.
40. Id. at 533.
41. Id. at 525-26.
42. Id. at 545.
43. Id. at 546.
44. Id. at 547.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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Swedish consultant wired the illicit payment. 48
As of April 2004, both defendants are awaiting sentencing. In both cases, the
statutory maximum sentence is "a term of imprisonment up to five years, followed
by a term of supervised release of three years; a maximum fine of $250,000, and a
special assessment of $100.00 for each felony count -A9 The defendants also
were ordered to repay $127,000 to the World Bank as restitution to account for the
loss to the institution as a result of the corrupt payments involved in the case. °
Furthermore, the non-economic personal and reputation costs to each of the
defendants who, prior to his involvement in this scheme, held prominent positions
in the leading global development finance institution, are also notable.
Criminal referrals were also made in this case to Kenyan and Swedish
prosecutors. While the Kenyan prosecution is still ongoing, a court in Sweden, in
February 2004, sentenced two Swedish contractors to prison for 18 months and 12
months respectively for bribery 51
The plea agreements orchestrated by the Department of Justice (DOJ) include
a provision that should strengthen the World Bank's anti-corruption efforts. Both
agreements require the defendants to cooperate with the World Bank in the
investigation of any matter about which the defendants have knowledge.
Specifically, the provision states that
The defendant agrees to disclose completely and truthfully all information
regarding his activities and those of others in all matters about which he has
knowledge or hereafter acquires knowledge concerning any matter about which
the United States, The World Bank, or the Government[s] of Sweden [or Kenya]
may inquire. Defendant agrees to accompany agents of the United States, The
World Bank, or the Government[s] of Sweden [or Kenya] to any location in order
to accomplish that purpose Defendant agrees to answer all questions
completely and truthfully and must not withhold any information.
52
This provision gives the World Bank the opportunity to compel cooperation
from the defendants, subsequent to their termination from World Bank
employment. The provision is an especially valuable tool because the defendants
would otherwise no longer be required to cooperate with World Bank investigators
under the World Bank Staff Rules 53 and because the World Bank does not have the
power to compel cooperation otherwise. Given the possibility that the corruption
scheme in which Mr. Sengupta and Mr. Basu engaged might involve additional
World Bank employees, consultants or borrower country agents, this provision
allows the World Bank to continue their investigation with the assistance of the
48. Id. at 548.
49. Id. at 534.
50. Id. at 507.
51. Gus Selassie, Swedish Nationals Convicted of Bribery, Connection with World Bank-
Funded Project in Kenya, WORLD MARKETS RES. CENTRE DAILY ANALYSis, Feb. 6, 2004.
52. A.B.A., supra note 30, at 508, 534-35.
53. Staff Rules, supra note 15, at § 8.01, 5.04 (requiring staff members to cooperate in
investigations).
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defendants.
This provision is an unprecedented development in the landscape of
international organizations and their anti-corruption efforts. For the first time, an
international financial institution assisted national prosecutors of a Member
government and also helped coordinate prosecution efforts between Member
governments, without an express mutual legal assistance treaty that provides for
such cooperation. The World Bank's authority to do so presumably derives from
its own treaty obligations under its Articles of Agreement requiring it to "make
arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are used only for the purposes
for which the loan was granted. 54 The deterrent and punitive value of effective
criminal prosecution helps to maintain the integrity of all World Bank loans.
Although it is unclear whether the DOJ would revoke its plea agreement with
the defendants if they refused to cooperate with the World Bank under this
provision, the threat of revocation may be potent enough to ensure the cooperation
of the defendants. The World Bank should, when possible, use this new legal
assistance provision in its anti-corruption efforts while also working with the DOJ
to ensure that they include and enforce the provision in future plea agreements
involving World Bank employees.
The use of criminal referrals is a positive development in the World Bank's
strategy to curb corruption in its projects. In addition to providing a legal
instrument to secure cooperation from corrupt actors after the termination of their
employment, criminal referrals provide an additional avenue by which to seek
punishment for corrupt behavior, providing further deterrence of such activity
B. C v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 55 and Bank
Disclosure Policies - Roadblocks to Effective Criminal Referral
The World Bank is generally immune from judicial process in member State
courts for matters arising out of the employment relationship. 56 To protect the
employment rights of its staff, the World Bank has its own internal Administrative
Tribunal that hears and grants judgments in cases brought by employees for
violations of their employment contracts or terms of appointment, including staff
rules and related regulationsY.7 A recent decision by the Administrative Tribunal, C
v. IBRD, addresses for the first time the issue of criminal referrals by the World
Bank. The decision imposes serious limitations on criminal referrals that will
54. World Bank Group, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Articles of
Agreement, art. III § 5, available at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) [hereinafter
IBRD Articles of Agreement].
55. C v. int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Dec. No. 272 (World Bank Admin. Trib. 2002)
[hereinafter C v. IBRD].
56. See Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (analyzing World Bank Articles
of Agreement, International Organizations immunities Act, and customary international law).
57 World Bank, World Bank Administrative Tribunal, Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association
and International Finance Corporation, art. II (2001), available at
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/crn/wbt/wbtwebsite.nsf (last visited Mar. 22,2004).
VOL. 32:2
THE WORLD BANK'S ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
undoubtedly weaken the efficacy of such referrals as a punitive and deterrent tool
in the Bank's anti-corruption efforts.
In the case, the Applicant was referred to the DOJ in connection with
allegedly corrupt activity that had led to his termination from employment at the
World Bank. The Applicant contested the decisions of the World Bank, inter alia,
(1) "to refer the case to the DOJ for prosecution without notifying him;" (2) "to
deny him access to relevant documents and evidence necessary to his defense;"
and (3) "to withhold from him information in his personnel file while failing to
inform him of its transfer to third parties."58 The Tribunal held in his favor,
announcing that the Bank's Staff Rules and Policy on Disclosure of Information
require the World Bank to notify an employee of a criminal referral and to provide
him with copies of most of the documents referred to the DOJ. 59 The Tribunal
ordered the World Bank to pay the Applicant $150,000 in damages for its failure
both to notify him and to provide him with documents, in addition to damages for
other unrelated claims.
60
This section reviews this decision along with the applicable World Bank
administrative provisions and cites numerous flaws both in the Tribunal's
reasoning and in the World Bank's policies on disclosure. In order to fully benefit
from the deterrent and punitive value of criminal referrals, the Administrative
Tribunal should reverse itself and the World Bank should introduce new
regulations for disclosure in corruption-related criminal referrals to counter the
Tribunal's holding and to reform the current regulations.
I. Referral and Notification Requirements
As an international organization, the World Bank is not governed by the laws
of any nation and must rely on its administrative rules and Tribunal decisions to
define the rights of its employees. These rights are codified primarily in the World
Bank Staff Rules. Throughout C v. IBRD, the Tribunal cites World Bank Staff
Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01 as the source of law for the World Bank's right
to refer an employee to prosecutors and for that employee's right to be notified of
such a referral. Staff Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01 states:
The following staff records and personnel information may be released to persons
outside the Bank Group without the authorization of the staff member concerned:
(a) basic employment data such as name, employment status, employment dates,
job title and department; (b) compensation and pension information released to
member governments for tax purposes; (c) pension records made available to a
consulting actuary; (d) visa status of staff and dependents reported to
governmental authorities; (e) pension, benefits and salary records made available
to external auditors and accountants; (f) information necessary for processing
medical, workers' compensation and other insurance claims; (g) benefits
information necessary to coordinate exchange or joint benefits programs, and
58. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 4.
59. Id. 25.
60. Id. 35.
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information necessary to coordinate benefit policies with other international
organizations; and (h) information on a staff member's salary, accrued separation
grant, accrued pension benefits, and designated pension and insurance
beneficiaries released consistent with a final court order or request from a judicial
or civil authority in cases of divorce or family maintenance to which a staff
member has not responded within 30 days of the Bank Group bringing the request
or order to the staff member's attention.
The Bank Group will not release other personnel information to outside parties,
including member governments and their representatives, without the staff
member knowledge, except in cases of emergency situations or upon advice from
the Legal Department of the Bank to release information for legal proceedings or
law enforcement efforts. In such cases, the staff member will be notified as soon as
reasonably possible of what information is released and to whom.6 1
The Staff Rule explicitly allows the World Bank to refer personnel
information to third parties and requires the World Bank to notify an employee of
the release of a narrow category of personnel information for legal proceedings or
law enforcement efforts, "as soon as reasonably possible. 62 In C v. IBRD, the
Tribunal applies this provision for the first time to an actual case and, through
reasoning that is often incorrect and unclear, expands the World Bank's duty to
notify employees and creates significant uncertainty about the disclosure rules in
subsequent cases.
(a) Notification of the Referral to the Department of Justice
The Tribunal writes that "the disclosure requirement imposed upon the Bank
by this Staff Rule covers both the fact of a referral and the content of what is being
referred. 63 The Tribunal then disposes of the Applicant's claim, that the World
Bank referred him to the DOJ without notification, finding that it is "clear from the
record that the Applicant was aware of the fact of a referral being made to the
DOJ. This was not the result of specific notification to him but transpired from the
general context in which the Bank conducted its investigation and pursued its
cooperation with United States and Swedish authorities." 64
It is unclear whether the Tribunal is implying that a blanket right exists to be
notified of a referral to prosecutors. Under the Staff Rule, the duty to notify an
employee depends upon the type of information referred, attaching only when
"other personnel information," not specified in clauses (a) through (h) of the rule,
is referred. For example, if the World Bank refers only basic employment data
such as the name and employment status of an employee, under clause (a) of the
rule, notification to the employee of the referral would not be required.65
61. Id. 5 (emphasis in original) (quoting Staff Rules, supra note 15, at § 2.01, 5.02).
62. Id.
63. Id. 7
64. Id.
65. Id. 5.
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Furthermore, the Tribunal's subjective standard for notice, relying on the
Applicant's awareness of the referral based on "the general context in which the
Bank conducted its investigation," 66 is unhelpful to the World Bank's legal
department when refemng future employees to prosecutors. The Tribunal
provides no guidance on what kind of "general context" would suffice not to
require notification in future cases. Given the remainder of the opinion, which
holds that notification is required for the disclosure of various types of
information,67 the World Bank will probably err on the side of caution and notify
the employee upon referral in future cases.
(b) Referral and Notification Requirements for Specific Documents
While Staff Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01 imposes a notification
requirement upon the World Bank when "other personnel information" is referred,
the Tribunal does not offer any definition of what constitutes personnel
information for the purposes of the rule. For example, the Tribunal holds that hotel
and travel information related to the Applicant's employment qualify as "other
personnel information, without any factual or legal basis for considering such
information personnel information. 68 The Tribunal also fails to define what is
meant by "as soon as reasonably possible. It may be persuasively argued that it is
unreasonable to inform an employee of the referral of information to criminal
prosecutors until a formal indictment has been filed, because the risk the employee
may destroy evidence, flee the jurisdiction or tamper with witnesses is such a
serious one. Without any definition of "personnel information" or what is
reasonable in terms of timing the notification, the World Bank's legal department
must perform significant guesswork to determine what it can refer and when it
must notify an employee of a referral.
While non-personnel information is not subject to Staff Rule section 2.01,
paragraph 5.01, the Tribunal broadens the applicability of the rule to include non-
personnel operational records. In considering the operational records referred in
the case, the Tribunal writes that it "is satisfied that nothing in them relates to the
accusations against the Applicant. It follows that such documents can be
released without notifying him thereof., 69 The Tribunal implies that a
notification requirement exists for non-personnel information if the Tribunal
determines that the information is related to accusations against the Applicant.
The test is a misguided expansion of the World Bank's notification requirements.
The Tribunal cannot know whether the referred information relates to accusations
against the Applicant simply because accusations have not been made by the DOJ.
The Tribunal's test expands the notification requirements and is grounded in
speculation and provides no clear rule for the World Bank legal department to
follow.
66. Id. 7.
67. Id. 8-35.
68. Id. Il.
69. Jd. 12.
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Furthermore, the Tribunal announces disclosure and notification requirements
for non-personnel information that may be personal in nature. The Tribunal relies
on the World Bank's Policy on Disclosure of Information of March 1994, as
revised effective 2002, which establishes constraints on the disclosure of
information. 70 The relevant constraints, according to the Tribunal, include:
(i) documents and information provided to the Bank only "on the explicit or
implied understanding that they will not be disclosed outside the Bank, or that
they may not be disclosed without the consent of the source; or even,
occasionally, that access within the Bank will be limited" must be treated
accordingly by the Bank;
(ii) documents and records that are subject to the attorney-client privilege, or
whose disclosure might prejudice an investigation, shall not be made publicly
available, this constraint reflecting a general principle of privileged information
even though it was explicitly introduced only in 2002; and
(iii) appropriate safeguards must be maintained in order to protect the personal
privacy of staff members and the confidentiality of personal information about
them, all in accordance with the Principles of Staff Employment.
7 1
The Tribunal finds that the existence of an express or implied condition of
non-disclosure forbids the disclosure of certain non-personnel information to third
72parties. In this case, the Tribunal finds that the release of bank records and credit
card statements by private banks to World Bank investigators, with the consent of
the Applicant, "was not expressly conditioned" on non-disclosure by the Bank.73
The Tribunal also finds there was no implied understanding of non-disclosure
because (a) "the disclosed information was fully available to the Applicant himself,
as it originated in his own personal business"- (b) "his ability to defend himself
was not jeopardized by the disclosure"- and (c) "the DOJ could in any event have
subpoenaed the records in the ordinary process of discovery available in the United
States legal system. 74
The Tribunal's reasoning creates an unclear test for determining whether an
implied understanding of non-disclosure exists in future cases. The Tribunal does
not define what type of information could jeopardize an employee's ability to
defend himself. In reality, no type of referral by the World Bank jeopardizes an
Applicant's defense before the DOJ. Because the Applicant has not been indicted
for any crime, he has no defense to prepare. If he is indicted, federal criminal
procedure provides him adequate opportunity to respond to allegations and defend
himself. His rights include the right to discovery, which includes the right to
inspect all information in the government's possession, which is material to the
70. ld. 13.
71. Id.
72. Id. 15.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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preparation of his defense. 75 The Tribunal does not consider this line of reasoning
and instead creates an unclear test to determine the existence of an implied
condition of non-disclosure.
Finally, the Tribunal holds that the World Bank may refer its investigative file
to prosecutors, but must notify the Applicant of the referral.76 This report includes
"summaries of various interviews conducted in the context of the Bank's
investigations, including interviews with the Applicant and other persons (inside
and outside the Bank) implicated in the relevant events" and "other materials that
came out in the course of these interviews. 77 While the Tribunal admits that the
investigative report is "not related to 'personnel matters,"' it applies the
notification standard for "other personnel information" of Staff Rule section 2.01,
paragraph 5.01 78 The Tribunal offers no justification for applying this notification
standard to the investigative report. In the process, the Tribunal greatly expands
the notification requirement imposed on the World Bank.
In looking to the Staff Rules and the Policy on Disclosure of Information to
determine what may be referred to prosecutors, the Tribunal ignores the World
Bank Sanctions Committee Procedures, which include a provision allowing for the
disclosure of any information related to criminal activity The Procedures provide
that "[i]f the Director of the INT determines that laws of member countries may
have been violated by a Respondent, the Director may at any time make available
to the law enforcement or administrative authorities of the countries involved any
information relating to such a violation." 79 The Sanctions Committee Procedures
pertain in large part to the relationship between the World Bank and its employees,
as they discuss an employee's rights throughout sanctioning proceedings. 80 These
procedures are a legitimate source of law for the question of the World Bank's
right to refer documents to criminal prosecutors and should have been addressed
by the Tribunal and deemed dispositive in favor of the Bank on the issue of the
right to refer documents.8t Instead, the Tribunal's opinion failed to mention any of
these procedures.
75. FED. R. CRIM. P 16(a)(l)(C).
76. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 21.
77. Id. 16.
78. Id. l1.
79 Sanctions Committee Procedures, supra note 18, at § 16(a).
80. Id. at intro.(d).
81. Cf de Merode v. World Bank, Decision No. I (World Bank Admin. Trib.1981). In Merode,
the Tribunal held that, in addition to other sources of law, "elements of the legal relationship between
the Bank and its personnel are also to be found in the Personnel Manual, the Field Office Manual,
various administrative circulars and in certain notes and statements of the management. Id. 22. The
Tribunal cautioned, however, that "not all the provisions of these manuals, circulars, notes, and
statements are included in the conditions of employment. Some of them have the character of simple
statements of current policy or lay down certain practical or purely procedural methods of operation. It
is, therefore, necessary to decide in each case whether the provision constitutes one of the conditions of
employment. Id.
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(c) Referral and Notification Requirements after C v. IBRD
C. v. IRBD produces an intricate, and often ill-defined, web of considerations
for the World Bank's legal department regarding disclosure and notification related
to criminal referrals. The legal department must work without knowing whether
there is a blanket right to notify an employee of a criminal referral, regardless of
the type of information referred. The lack of a definition for both "personnel"
information and notice "as soon as reasonably possible" confounds the application
of Staff Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01. For non-personnel information that
falls outside of that rule, the World Bank must determine whether the Tribunal will
feel that the referred information relates to accusations against the employee,
despite the fact that the DOJ has not made any accusations. Furthermore, if the
referral includes non-personnel information that is personal, the World Bank must
determine whether an express or implied condition of non-disclosure exists and
whether the referral will jeopardize the employee's defense before the DOJ, again
without any accusations being made by the DOJ. The Tribunal must make all of
these considerations under the shadow of an expensive potential monetary
judgment.
The result of all of these considerations, in practical terms, is that the World
Bank will now notify employees of all documents referred to the DOJ and may
reconsider some referral decisions to avoid thorny questions, such as the existence
of implied conditions of non-disclosure. This result is detrimental to the World
Bank's overall anti-corruption strategy in two serious ways.
First, notification of referrals creates serious risks that the employee will
obstruct the criminal investigation. In its pleadings, the Bank raised concerns that
the Applicant "might attempt to destroy evidence, flee the jurisdiction, or harass
and intimidate witnesses" once he is notified or granted access to investigative
documents.8 2 The Tribunal casts aside these concerns by stating that, in this case,
the Applicant has cooperated with the World Bank and the DOJ, allaying any fears
of obstruction by the Applicant.83 The Tribunal's reasoning is based upon a naive
assumption. The Applicant is required to cooperate with World Bank investigators
under World Bank Staff Rules.84 His carrying out his duties as an employee does
not mean that he has refrained or will refrain from covering up his corrupt activity
once he is notified that he has been referred to the DOJ. In fact, referral for
criminal prosecution raises the possible harm an employee may face and may
provide a greater incentive to an employee to cover up his activities. The Tribunal
is simply in no position to know whether the Applicant has engaged or will engage
in such obstructive activities, simply because he may have cooperated in the past.
Second, the complex disclosure and notification requirements imposed under
C v. IBRD will probably result in the World Bank referring fewer documents to
national prosecutors. This development will impact the effectiveness of criminal
82. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 24.
83. Id.
84. Staff Rules, supra note 15, § 8.01, 5.04 ("Staff members are required to cooperate in the
investigation and failure or refusal to do so may constitute misconduct.").
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prosecutions, by both limiting the scope and pace of criminal investigations. The
result will be a reduction in the usefulness of criminal referrals as a punitive and
deterrent tool for corruption within the World Bank and a weakening of the overall
anti-corruption efforts of the World Bank.
2. Access to the Documents Referred
(a) Personnel Documents
The Tribunal also reads Staff Rule section 2.01, paragraph 5.01 to include a
right to view the contents of the personnel information referred to criminal
prosecutors.8 5 It reads the rule to require the World Bank to give the Applicant the
actual documents falling under this rule.86 The Tribunal provides no legal
reasoning for this conclusion. Instead, it is possible to interpret the rule narrowly as
requiring a notification of only what information has been released, which might
consist simply of a list of the documents referred, rather than copies of the
documents themselves. Unfortunately, the Tribunal does not ponder the nuances
of rule interpretation but rather decrees that the rule encompasses access to the
documents themselves.
(b) Non-Personnel Documents - The Investigative Report
The component of the Tribunal's holding that will be the most detnmental to
successful cnminal referrals is the finding that the Applicant should receive copies
of the World Bank investigative report referred to the DOJ. 7 The investigative
report includes summanes of interviews with the Applicant and witnesses,
investigator notes and other materials uncovered dunng the investigation."
The Tribunal finds that the Applicant's access to the referred investigative
report is "a matter that essentially is governed by pnnciples of due process and fair
treatment., 89 For the Tribunal, access to the investigative report is essential for the
Applicant's right to respond to allegations against him. The prncipal authority the
Tribunal cites is its previous decision, King v. International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development." The Tribunal writes:
The Tribunal set out detailed standards for the handling of misconduct under Staff
Rule 8.01 in King, Decision No. 131 [1993]. The Tribunal assigned particular
importance to the conduct of the investigation, to the right of the accused staff
85. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 7
86. Id.
87. Id. It is important to be clear that the Tribunal found the referral of the investigative report
permissible under the World Bank's Policy on Disclosure of Information. See Staff Rules, supra note
15, at § 2.01, 5.01. The Tribunal did not analyze the disclosure under World Bank Staff Rule section
2.01, paragraph 5.01, which applies to personnel information, assumedly because it did not consider the
documents to constitute personal information, although the Tribunal did not explicitly say so.
88. Cv. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 16.
89. Id. 17
90. Id. 23
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member to respond, and to questions of due process. In respect of the right to
respond, the Tribunal specifically held that "the entitlement of the staff member to
respond presupposes an exact knowledge of the charge made against him and
extends to the right to give a properly considered answer to, or comment upon,
every aspect of the case made against him." 
91
The Tribunal was correct in finding that King established a "basic rule of due
process that an accused person should be confronted with a specific charge and be
given an opportunity to reply to It."' 9 2 The King decision, however, dealt solely
with an employee's due process rights in the context of allegations in internal
disciplinary proceeding.93 The Tribunal extends the due process protection in King
to an entirely different context-the relationship between an employee and his
national authorities in a prosecution against him.94 The Tribunal's extension of an
employee's due process rights to this context is flawed on numerous grounds.
Most importantly, the DOJ has not made any allegations against the
Applicant. Once allegations are made, in the form of a grand jury indictment or
information, the Applicant will have a chance to face his accuser, the United States
government, and undertake discovery of prosecution documents and respond to
any charges in a court of law without any "guesswork," a concern the Tribunal
cites explicitly 95 The Applicant's due process rights under the United States
Constitution are protected from the moment his file is referred to the DOJ and he
may petition the court with any procedural grievances he may have. Thus, his
ability to defend himself against any allegation by the DOJ has not been impaired
in any manner, a concern the Tribunal raises.
96
Furthermore, like any other individual under investigation by the DOJ, the
Applicant does not have a right to access the files and records in the possession of
prosecutors prior to the start of formal criminal proceedings. In the U.S, and
common law systems generally there simply is no right to know where you stand
in the eyes of prosecutors while they investigate you, a privilege to which the
Tribunal believes the Applicant is entitled.97 Even in internal World Bank
proceedings, under King, the employee does not have a right to information about
his case until a formal allegation is made.98 In civil law systems, a suspect's right
to access investigative documents similarly attaches only once the formal
investigative process has been launched by either the police or the public
prosecutor, though the defendant may have access to files earlier than in common
law systems. 99 Neither system compels a victim to turn over her documents or the
91. Id. (quoting King v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Decision No. 131, at9 35 (World
Bank Admin. Trib. 1993) [hereinafter King v. IBRD]).
92. King v. IBRD, Decision No. 13i, at 935.
93. King v. IBRD, Decision No. 131, at 9 29-82.
94. See C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at IM 3-35.
95. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 26.
96. Id. 932.
97. Id. 21.
98. King v. JBRD, Decision No. 13 i, at 1 33-37.
99. See Mario Chiavario, Private Parties: The Rights of the Defendant and the Victim, in
EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 541, 558 (Mireille Delmas-Marty and J.R. Spencer eds., 2002).
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content of her communication with the police to the defendant. In both systems,
the suspect's due process rights are only in relation to the national authority
investigating him, not to the victim who refers him.
The Tribunal's decision in C v IBRD creates an unprecedented right of access
to the DOJ investigation that is flawed on legal grounds under procedural rules of
both common law and civil law systems. Prior to the Tribunal case, the Applicant
was in no different position than any other individual under investigation by the
DOJ. The Tribunal's holding, however, puts him in a privileged position as
compared to all other individuals under the DOJ's jurisdiction. It alters the
relationship between him and his member government to the detriment of the latter
and is thus an illegitimate intrusion into the domestic legal process of a member
government.
The Tribunal also reasons that "[s]trict enforcement of due process will also
likely avoid accusations of a general nature unsupported by specific evidence that
could mislead the national authorities."'lo This concern is allayed by the fact that
government prosecutors are charged with the task of evaluating evidence for its
veracity and integrity when constructing a case. If the facts of an investigative file
contain speculative assertions, prosecutors can disregard such facts, or refrain from
pursuing the prosecution. If unsubstantiated facts are introduced during trial, the
criminal process allows the defense to produce contrary evidence and attack the
veracity of any testifying witness.
The Tribunal also errs in its rationale for granting access to the documents by
placing an inordinate degree of evidentiary weight to the investigative reports
referred to the DOJ by the World Bank. The Tribunal raises alarm that "none of
these documents bears the signature of the Applicant as evidence of his having
admitted or accepted its conclusions."' '" The Tribunal ignores well-established
rules of evidence in the U.S. denoting such summaries and notes as inadmissible
hearsay 102 At trial, the court would require the World Bank investigator to testify
about his interviews and would not allow the summaries themselves to be
introduced as evidence. The procedural protections of the U.S. legal system make
the Tribunal's protection unnecessary The result is only to impede the effective
criminal investigation of the alleged corrupt activity
The C v. IBRD holding is further flawed on the grounds of fundamental policy
considerations. Notification of criminal referral and access to referred documents
raises the risk that an employee will engage in activities to obstruct the criminal
investigation. As described earlier, the Tribunal is in no position to determine
whether such obstruction has occurred or will occur based solely on the
Applicant's prior cooperation, much of which was required by the World Bank's
Staff Rules.
Even assuming the Applicant has not engaged in obstructive activity he may
100. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 26.
101. d.j125.
102. FED. R. EviD. 801(c) (defining hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.").
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not know the full extent of the facts uncovered against him. With access to the
investigative file, the employee could read witness interviews and see documents,
which he may not have before known existed. His new knowledge could plausibly
change his disposition with respect to cooperating. The Tribunal cannot know the
risk of the Applicant destroying evidence, fleeing the jurisdiction or tampering
with witnesses until the Applicant views the documents that have been referred to
the DOJ. In this scenario, where an employee's level of cooperation could easily
change, a bright-line rule barring access to such documents would ensure that
employees who would want to obstruct the investigation would not have an
opportunity to do so.
The Tribunal continues and states that "[n]or could the documents concerned
be in any way destroyed or tampered with by the Applicant as they were already in
the hands of the Bank and, later, of the Department of Justice."1 0 3 The risk is not
that the Applicant will destroy the specific files that have already been referred;
rather, the risks are that other related evidence not yet subpoenaed will be
destroyed, or the Applicant will tamper with witnesses before they are deposed by
prosecutors or testify in the case. By ignoring the true risk involved in granting
employees access to the investigative report, the Tribunal's rationale for allowing
access to the documents is further flawed.
By saying that the facts of this case provide no specific risks, the Tribunal
creates an ambiguous rule for the World Bank to follow in subsequent cases.
Should the World Bank withhold its investigative report when it believes the
person is a flight risk and expose itself to additional adverse judgments by the
Tribunal if the Applicant does not flee? It is more likely that the Tribunal's
holding will result in the World Bank turning over the investigative report to all
subjects of referral in the future. This result is a disastrous policy as the real risks
outlined above, ignored by the Tribunal in C v. IBRD, may be present in future
cases and the effective subsequent prosecution of corruption may be seriously
compromised.
Finally the Tribunal states that it has "reservations with respect to
unnecessarily secretive procedures, which tend to result in unfair accusations and
investigations."' 4 Questioning the administrative procedures and judgments of
divisions within the World Bank is a core component of the mandate of the
Administrative Tribunal. The characterization of corruption investigations and
subsequent criminal referral as "unnecessarily secretive, however, reveals a
fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of effective anti-corruption efforts
within organizations. Secrecy during an investigation and in the referral of
information to prosecutors is essential to ensure that a suspect does not obstruct the
investigation. There are sufficient due process guarantees already in place to
ensure that such secrecy does not impose an unfair result upon a World Bank
employee. Under King, the employee has a right to face his accuser in an internal
103. C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 24.
104. Id. 26.
VOL. 32:2
THE WORLD BANK'S ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
investigation.105 Under the laws of his national jurisdiction, the employee has a
right to face his national accuser in a court of law The Tribunal's reservations in
this regard are both redundant and misguided and result in an unprecedented
expansion of employee due process rights that guts the mechanism of criminal
referral as an anti-corruption tool at the World Bank.
3. Addressing the Legal Obstacles ofC v. IBRD and World Bank Rules
The explicit provisions of the Staff Rules and the Policy on Disclosure of
Information impose limits on referrals while contemplating some form of
employee notification. 1 6 The requirements specified in those provisions are
expanded and complicated in the Tribunal's holding in C v. IBRD. In order to
restore the World Bank's anti-corruption efforts, the procedures related to criminal
referrals should be reformed. A new Staff Rule ought to be implemented allowing
for the referral of any information, both personnel and non-personnel, to
prosecutorial bodies in cases involving employee corruption, without notification
and access.
Such a narrow provision would carve out a small area of full and unfettered
disclosure for special cases involving corruption. Criminal referrals are different
from disclosures to the general public and the due process and privacy rights of
employees referred to the DOJ are protected under U.S. laws. Any remaining
concerns about employee privacy should be outweighed by the World Bank's need
for effective anti-corruption efforts, for which secrecy is essential. While staff
opposition to such a new rule may be significant, the absence of such a provision
will aid corrupt employees, who break the laws of the nations in which they work,
in avoiding the most serious consequences for their actions.
III. STANDARD OF PROOF CONCERNS IN INTERNAL CORRUPTION INVESTIGATIONS
The official standard of proof needed to be met to impose sanctions is
evidence that is "reasonably sufficient to support a finding that the Respondent
engaged in a fraudulent or corrupt practice ,,107 The World Bank Tribunal has
never announced the precise meaning of the "reasonably sufficient" standard.
105. Id. 23; King v. IBRD, Decision No. 13 1, at 36.
106. See World Bank, The World Bank Policy on Disclosure of Information, June 2002, at § IV
89. In its discussion of the World Bank Policy on Disclosure, the Tribunal ignores one explicit
constraint. "The individual records and personal medical information of Executive Directors and their
Alternates and Advisors, of the President of the Bank, and of Bank staff, as well as proceedings of
internal appeal mechanisms and investigations, are not disclosed outside the Bank, except to the extent
permitted by the Staff Rules. Id. (emphasis added). While the Tribunal does not address whether the
files referred in this case would qualify as "proceedings" of investigations, it is plausible that they
could. Furthermore, the Tribunal ignores the Sanctions Committee Procedures which provide a blanket
right of referral, contrary to the Policy of Disclosure and the holding of the current case. Thus, there is a
need for an explicit Staff Rule provision allowing referral of all types of documents related to
corruption investigations without notification to bring clarity to the legal regime for referral and to
bolster the effectiveness of criminal referrals.
107 Sanctions Committee Procedures, supra note 18, at § 13.
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While no standard is without some uncertainty, the World Bank's standard,
standing alone, is devoid of any meaning without further definition of the clause
"reasonably sufficient to support. The World Bank standard, as it currently
stands, could require anything from evidence that establishes that the corrupt
activity was more likely than not to have occurred (the common preponderance of
the evidence standard) to evidence that establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that
the corrupt activity occurred. A recent case raises serious concerns about the
standard of proof applied in World Bank administrative proceedings involving
corruption and fraud.
In September 2002, the High Court of Lesotho convicted Acres International,
a prominent multinational engineering firm, of two criminal counts of corruption
related to bribes paid to a senior government official in Lesotho for contracts
related to an $8 billion water project, of which the World Bank contributed $150
million.10 8 Prior to the criminal conviction, the World Bank's Fraud and
Corruption Committee had conducted a two-year investigation into Acres and
found insufficient evidence to justify debarment.'0 9
This sequence of events, in which evidence against Acres clears the higher
hurdle of reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding in Lesotho, while failing to
satisfy the presumably lower standard of proof in the World Bank, raises serious
concerns about the efficacy of the World Bank's sanctioning mechanism. Before
one discredits the World Bank's sanctioning mechanism, it is important to note
that the Lesotho court, being a national cnminal body, may have accessed evidence
unavailable to World Bank internal investigators, given the lack of subpoena
power of the World Bank.'"' Furthermore, the integrity of the criminal procedure
in Lesotho should be further studied to ensure that the conviction was free from
any political motivation or other impropriety. The World Bank, noting the
conviction in Lesotho, formally reopened its investigation of Acres in March
2004."'
Despite these factors, however, the Acres case reveals a need for clarification
of the "reasonably sufficient" standard in World Bank corruption proceedings. A
standard roughly equivalent to the common "preponderance of the evidence" or
"more likely than not" standard might be an appropriate approach. These
standards, which are widely used in legal systems around the world in non-
criminal matters, are regarded as balancing the interests of fairness to defendants
with the interest of judicial expediency. If the current "reasonably sufficient"
standard is higher than a preponderance of the evidence, lowering the standard
108. Michael Dynes, Net Closes on Western Corruption in Africa, TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 28, 2002,
at 16.
109. Catherine Porter, Oakville Engineering Company Braces for African Bribery Verdict,
TORONTO STAR, Sept. 12, 2002, at DO 1.
110. See id. Defense counsel for Acres argued that the evidence was identical to evidence presented
at the World Bank internal proceeding. Id. Such claim should of course be taken with grain of salt,
as it is clearly meant to imply that the defendant should be freed of all charges in the pending matter.
I l. David Pallister, World Bank Corruption Inquiry May Blacklist Firm, GUARDIAN, Mar. 16,
2004, at 18.
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could rid the Bank of corrupt agents, like Acres, in a more timely and effective
manner while ensuring the fundamental fairness of the sanctioning system.
The World Bank could also follow the example of some U.S. government
agencies that consider civil or criminal convictions against a contractor for certain
related or unrelated offenses, such as theft or tax evasion, as sufficient evidence as
a matter of law for debarment. 12 The World Bank could similarly regard
debarment from government contracting systems in member governments as
sufficient grounds to debar contractors from World Bank contracts. While these
contractors would not have committed any fraud against the World Bank, a pattern
of poor performance on prior contracts can be enough of a substantial risk to
World Bank contracts as to require debarment."i' Such an approach, however,
might yield a far greater number of debarments of firms and individuals from
Western countries that have more developed national government debarment
systems. Such a result might prove to be a substantial political impediment to
instituting such a system of debarment. The World Bank could impose shorter
periods of debarment in cases such as these to compensate for the lack of a full
investigation into firms. The Bank could also institute a system of suspensions, or
short term freezing of funding, pending full investigation. Suspensions usually
require a lower standard of proof, so that the initiation of criminal or civil
proceedings for certain offenses can trigger a suspension.' 14
A further development that could dramatically reduce the time spent on
investigations and more easily locate and eradicate corrupt activities is the
implementation of an illicit enrichment provision in the World Bank's Sanctions
Committee Procedures. Illicit enrichment provisions generally function by
allowing prosecutors to introduce evidence of a government official's unexplained
wealth or extravagant standard of living and to shift the burden to the person to
prove a legitimate source for that wealth or standard of living.' 5 A failure by the
government official "to provide an adequate explanation would mean that the
official must have traded on the governmental authority vested in him for personal
gain." 116
Illicit enrichment is most notably used in the successful anti-corruption efforts
of Hong Kong." 7 Furthermore, all major multilateral conventions call for signatory
112. See e.g., Steven A. Shaw, Suspension and Debarment: The First Line of Defense Against
Contractor Fraud and Abuse, REPORTER, Mar. 1999, at 4 (discussing suspension and debarment rules
in the United States Air Force).
113. Id. at 5 (writing that the U.S. Air Force has wide latitude to debar firms for a history of
unsatisfactory performance on private contracts, conduct that is neither criminal nor related to public
contracts. The author points out, however, that agencies have failed to take advantage of such broad
discretion).
114. See id. at 4.
115. Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International Corruption
Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L&COMP LAW 793, 813 (2001).
116. Id. at 814.
i 17 Section I 0(I) of the Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance provides that:
(1) Any person who, being or having been prescribed officer, (a) maintains standard
of living above that which is commensurate with his present or past official emoluments;
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governments to establish illicit enrichment as a criminal offense."18 Illicit
enrichment is not a criminal offense in jurisdictions like the U.S. because it
conflicts with a defendant's constitutional right to refrain from testifying against
himself in a criminal matter."19 However, the notion of illicit enrichment and
burden-shifting to a defendant can be found m U.S. civil proceedings, including
civil asset forfeiture actions related to criminal activity 120 Evidence that a person is
living beyond his lifestyle can help build probable cause to support a civil
forfeiture action which, when established, shifts the burden to the accused to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the legitimate source of the asset in
question. 121
Illicit enrichment provisions recognize the importance of integrity among
public officials and understand both that unexplained wealth is a powerful
indicator of impropriety among civil servants and that evidence of corruption is
often hard to gather, a challenge that is even more acute in the case of the World
Bank, given its lack of subpoena power. 122 Establishing illicit enrichment, without
an adequate explanation by the official, as a sufficient ground to find against an
employee for breaching his duties to the World Bank could offer a faster and more
effective method of finding and expelling corrupt actors from the World Bank.
An illicit enrichment provision would not violate any established due process
rights of World Bank employees. Employees do not have a privilege against self-
incrimination in internal investigation proceedings. In fact, the World Bank staff is
subject to an express duty to cooperate in internal investigations. World Bank
Staff Rule section 8.01, paragraph 5.04, states that in internal investigations,
"[s]taff members are required to cooperate in the investigation and failure or
refusal to do so may constitute misconduct, which can serve as a ground for
termination under the Staff Rules. 23 The World Bank also expressly allows
or (b) is in control of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his present or
past official emoluments, shall, unless he gives a satisfactory explanation to the court as
to how he was able to maintain such standard of living or how such pecuniary
resources or property came under his control, be guilty of an offence.
Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, available at http://www.icac.org.hk/eng/prevt (last
visited Jan. 30, 2002).
118. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 3, at art. IX (mandating that signatories "[slubject
to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State Party that has not yet
done so shall take the necessary measures to establish under its laws as an offense a significant increase
in the assets of government official that he cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings
dunng the performance of his functions. Among those States Parties that have established illicit
enrichment as an offense, such offense shall be considered an act of corruption for the purposes of this
Convention."). See also OECD Convention, supra note 2, at art. i, 2; U.N. Convention, supra note 4, at
art. 20.
119 U.S. CONST. amend. V
120. See United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1989).
12 1. See id. at 390 (holding where "a defendant's verifiable income cannot possibly account for the
level of wealth displayed and where there is strong evidence that the defendant is a drug trafficker, then
there is probable cause to believe that the wealth is either direct product of the illicit activity or that it
is traceable to the activity as proceeds.").
122. See supra note 110, and accompanying text.
123. Staff Rules, supra note 15, at §8.01, 5.04; see also id. § 0.01, Pnnciple 7. 1(b)(iv).
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internal investigators to "[c]all upon any staff member for the production of
documents believed to have probative value."'' 24 While the World Bank Tribunal
has not addressed whether staff members have a privilege against self-
incrimination during investigations, the express Staff Rules nowhere establish or
suggest such a privilege, but rather enunciate the opposite-a duty to cooperate.1
25
Given the lack of a self-incrimination privilege, the World Bank should proceed
with an illicit enrichment provision that considers unexplained wealth or
extravagant lifestyle, without adequate explanation, as sufficient to find staff
misconduct. A guarantee that financial records would not be disclosed to third
parties, other than criminal prosecutors in the case of corrupt activity, should be
made to protect the privacy of staff members.
The World Bank should also consider widespread financial disclosure
requirements for employees, covering all sources of income, to safeguard against
conflicts of interest. Currently, less than fifty senior World Bank officials are
subject to such disclosure. 126 Financial disclosure requirements for public officials
are seen as an essential component to ensunng the integrity of public
organizations. In the U.S., for example, detailed annual financial disclosures are
required of members of all three branches of government.127 Public officers of only
the highest grade are usually required to file, though given each grade has ten
steps, the total number of such officials across the federal government is
significant. 28 A wider base of individuals subject to such disclosure would
increase transparency and provide preliminary evidence under any illicit
enrichment provision once enacted. 1
29
IV INVESTIGATIVE INFORMATION SHARING AND CROSS-DEBARMENT
Currently, the World Bank does not have investigative information sharing or
cross-debarment agreements with other multilateral or bilateral development
124. Id. §8.01, 15.04.
125. Providing employees with such a privilege would be contrary to the Staff Rules as well as
detrimental to effective fact-finding and resolution of internal corruption investigations. Given the
Tribunal's expansive view of employee due process, and the suspiciousness with which it views the
World Bank's investigations, the World Bank may want to include an explicit provision, such as a staff
rule, that enunciates the fact that employees do not have privilege against self-incrimination. Note that
the issue of whether statements made by employees in a World Bank administrative proceeding can
later be excluded in a subsequent prosecution in a national court has not been litigated.
126. Staff Rules, supra note 15, at § 3.01, 8.02 (noting only "[sitaff members at the level of vice
president or above" are subject to the requirement); see also World Bank Group, Senior Management,
at http://web.worldbank.org (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) (listing senior management positions).
127. See generally Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
128. See e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 2634.202 (2003) (defining public filer for the purposes of executive
branch disclosure requirements).
129. In summary, U.S. government disclosure rules measure the sources and value of income and
do not require the disclosure of a public official's net worth. Ethics in Government Act, at §§102, 202,
302. Net worth evidence would have greater evidentiary value for World Bank investigators, in the
event that an illicit enrichment provision is adopted. Any effort to implement such disclosure
requirement, or any further disclosure requirements for that matter, would face significant political
opposition from staff members.
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finance institutions. Transnational corruption often involves repeat players who
may practice in numerous developing countries and contract with different
development banks. Sharing investigative information with other development
finance institutions and instituting a system of cross-debarment can expedite the
World Bank's corruption investigations and ensure that corrupt firms and
individuals can not be debarred by one lender only to find another institution to
defraud.
Substantial obstacles against implementing investigative information sharing
and cross-debarment agreements with other institutions exist. The first is the lack
of uniformity between different organizations in the quality of investigations and
the standards of proof used. In April 2003, the Fourth Conference of Investigators
of International and Bilateral Institutions convened in Brussels to address this
concern. 130 Representatives from the World Bank and the United Nations presented
a number of Uniform Guidelines for investigations, which were endorsed by
representatives from international and bilateral institutions. 131 The guidelines
include ethical principles for investigators, detailed procedural rules for
investigating and administering inculpatory and exculpatory findings, policies on
the confidentiality and protection of witnesses and the due process rights of
subjects.13 2 The Uniform Guidelines, however, are only aspirational principles to
which institutions are not bound. A second obstacle is the risk of institutions
debarring firms for political purposes. A bilateral mstitution may debar foreign
firms more often than domestic firms or may target specific firms for political
purposes, under the rouse of a corruption investigation.
The World Bank could sidestep these limitations by creating investigation
information sharing and cross-debarment agreement only with institutions that
conform to the uniform guidelines. Any agreement could also require institutions
to open their respective investigation files for review by their partner institutions,
in order to ensure that institutions are meeting the ethical and procedural
requirements of the uniform guidelines. Furthermore, the World Bank could
require additional evidence in cases in which it suspects that political motivations
marred the referring institution's investigation, or it could exercise its discretion
and not debar the firm. Given these suitable responses, an investigative
information sharing and cross-debarment regime would be a viable approach for
the World Bank to undertake to increase the effectiveness of its anti-corruption
efforts.
130. See Press Release, European Anti-Fraud Office, The 4th Conference of International
Investigators held in Brussels on 3rd and 4th April 2003 (Apr. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.europa.eu.int/geninfo/info-en.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
131. Id.
132. Address before The 4th Conference of International Investigators (Apr. 2003) (on file with
author).
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V STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS TO EFFECTIVE ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS AT
THE WORLD BANK
The World Bank's operational model, governance structure, oversight
capacity, staff and contractor incentive structure, bureaucratic norms, political
motivations and the status of the internal investigate body all pose additional
obstacles to the control of corruption within the World Bank. This section
addresses the problems arising when structural attributes of the Bank impede
effective anti-corruption efforts or even create incentives contrary to the goal of
curbing corruption at the World Bank.
A. The World Bank s Operational Model
Under the World Bank Articles of Agreement, the World Bank is authorized
only to lend to governments and to third parties when the loan is guaranteed by the
government in which the party is located. 133 Governments in developing countries
are responsible for the execution of projects and are given a large degree of
discretion to carry out projects. 3 4  Government agencies charged with
implementing projects are responsible for procuring firms and contractors for
projects and managing and disbursing the loan funds. 35
Structurally, this operational model exposes the World Bank to significant
corruption risk. Developing country governments are plagued with weak
procurement systems, insufficient supervisory personnel for projects, inadequate
resources for investigating and prosecuting corruption and poor legal rules and
procedures to prevent, detect, and address corruption.136 For example, in a recently
approved $46 million World Bank urban revitalization loan to Brazil, 3 7 the World
Bank noted that the coordinating agency in charge of overseeing the entire project,
FIDEM, "has the minimum structure necessary to undertake a project of this type,
133. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 54, at art. Ill § 4, available at
http://www.web.worldbank,org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004) ("The Bank may guarantee, participate in, or
make loans to any member or any political sub-division thereof and any business, industrial, and
agricultural enterprise in the territories of member, subject to the following conditions: (i) When the
member in whose territories the project is located is not itself the borrower, the member or the central
bank or some comparable agency of the member which is acceptable to the Bank, fully guarantees the
repayment of the pnncipal and the payment of interest and other charges on the loan.").
134. While World Bank loan documents are not publicly disclosed, World Bank Project Appraisal
Documents offer detailed descriptions of World Bank financed projects. Generally, the borrower
government manages the majority of the project with assistance from a World Bank Task Manager and
World Bank consultants. Project Appraisal Documents and other documents can be accessed on-line at:
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/ navigationjsp? pcont--browdoc (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
135. See e.g., WORLD BANK, PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT ON A PROPOSED LOAN IN THE
AMOUNT OF US$46.0 MILLION TO THE STATE OF PERNAMBUCO, BRAZIL WITH THE GUARANTEE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL FOR THE RECIFE URBAN UPGRADING PROJECT, REP No. 23331-BR
(Apr. 2003) (listing specific government responsibilities related to a recently approved $46 million
World Bank urban revitalization loan to Brazil) [hereinafter PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT].
136. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 16.
137 World Bank, World Bank Approves $46 Million For Low-Income Urban Upgrading In
Northeast Brazil, Apr. 24, 2003.
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but that structure is generally weak, understaffed and not entirely prepared to
address the complexities involved in a large, inter-institutional and governmental
project of this size."' 38 Public procurement and financial systems in these countries
may also be inadequate to ensure the integrity of the transactions. The appraisal
document of the same urban revitalization loan to Brazil, for example, noted that
FIDEM's "[olverall procurement capacity is considered weak and the risk for the
project is considered high."' 139
In addition, the World Bank's institutional mission to eradicate poverty 140
involves it in lending to the poorest countries in the world, which also tend-to be
the most corrupt. 141 The World Bank is also often called upon to lend to countries
emerging from conflict situations where the institutional structures are often too
weak to ensure the integrity of the funds lent to them. 142 In these situations, in
which countries do not have adequate institutional "absorption capacity" to handle
aid, lending can actually provide an incentive for governments to create poor
governance structures so that aid money can be diverted for illegitimate uses.143
The World Bank is also a bank in the traditional sense of the word and its
success is measured by traditional measures of banking success such as the rate of
return of its projects, which depends on the number of loans it makes and its rate of
default. 144 These measures ensure that the World Bank retains its superb credit
rating, as the "IBRD raises almost all its money in the world's financial markets"
where "[w]ith a AAA credit rating, it issues bonds to raise money and then passes
on the low interest rates to its borrowers."' 145 The pressure to make loans, and
especially large loans, creates a "culture of loan approval," characterized by a
pattern of overly optimistic and misguided lending that leads to a deterioration in
138. PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 136, at 35.
139. Id. at 37.
140. The World Bank's Mission Statement begins with "[olur dream is a world free of poverty"
and continues "[t]o fight poverty with passion and professionalism for lasting results. World Bank
Group, About Us, Mission Statement, at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2004).
141. At the time of this writing, the World Bank has active projects in all of the ten most corrupt
countries according to the 2002 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index. The
countries from least corrupt to most corrupt are: Moldova, Uganda, Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Kenya,
Angola, Madagascar, Paraguay, Nigeria, and Bangladesh. 2002 Transparency International Corruption
Perceptions Index, available at http://www.transparency.org/pressreleasesarchive/
2002/dwld/cpi2002.presrelease.en.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
142. Glenn T Ware & Gregory P Noone, The Culture of Corruption in the Postconflict and
Developing World, in IMAGINE COEXISTENCE: RESTORING HUMANITY AFTER ETHNIC VIOLENT
CONFLICT 191, 194 (Antoma Chayes & Martha Minow eds., 2003). See also Paul Blustem, G-7 Agrees
That Iraq Needs Help With Debt; Important Roles Seen For IMF World Bank, WASH. POST, Apr. 13,
2003, at A37
143. See Glenn T. Ware & Gregory P Noone, supra note 142, at 197 (discussing examples of
corrupt governmental schemes that may occur in the developing country and post-conflict contexts).
144. See World Bank, About Us, What is the World Bank, at http://www.worldbank.org/ (last
visited Feb. 15, 2004). The World Bank explicitly disagrees with this observation and describes itself
as "[nlot bank, but rather a specialized agency. The World Bank is not 'bank' in the common sense.
It is one of the United Nations' specialized agencies, and is made up of 184 member countries. These
countries are jointly responsible for how the institution is financed and how its money is spent. Id.
145. Id.
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the quality of loans made and exposes them to corruption. 146
[P]ressure to lend encourages Bank operations staff to identify their interests with
those of their clients in the recipient government. Task managers, who typically
operate in one sector, develop working relationships with government officials in
the relevant ministries. These officials, who implement projects under the
supervision of the task manager, are also responsible-or are closely connected to
the people responsible-for the approval of the next proposed Bank project for the
sector. Given that the task manager wants the project and the government needs
the loan, it does not take long for an understanding to develop in which problems
associated with existing projects are overlooked in exchange for a smooth path for
... .- i47
new projects in the pipeline.
Furthermore, if "lending [declines], the Bank will shrink in size and become a less
central player in the international economy ,,148
The World Bank itself first described this phenomenon in an internal 1992
report known as the Wapenhans Report, named after the World Bank Vice
President who directed the study producing the report. 149 The report found that this
culture of loan approval could be characterized by overly optimistic project
appraisal ratings, poor identification of risk factors, and inconsistent and subjective
evaluation criteria across projects that had resulted in over one-third of completed
Bank projects qualifying as failures under the Bank's own evaluation criteria. 15
The Wapenhans Report pointed towards gross corruption, finding that
seventy-eight percent of the financial conditions in World Bank loans were not
adhered to, a statistic that the report considered "startlingly low. ' ' lSi In subsequent
years, numerous reports of widespread corruption in World Bank financed projects
have surfaced. In 1997 for example, Business Week alleged that over $100 million
of a $500 million World Bank loan to the Russian coal sector either could not be
accounted for or had been diverted.152 At the time of the story, the World Bank was
146. Bruce Rich, The World Bank Under James Wolfensohn, in REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK
26,43 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002). See also HOWARD N. WHITE & A. GESKE
DIIKSTRA, PROGRAMME AID AND DEVELOPMENT- BEYOND CONDITIONALITY 489 (2003) ("aid agencies
exist to give away money, and there is an ample literature documenting that individual and agency
performance are assessed on the quantity of aid rather than its quality"). See also MICHELLE MILLER
ADAMS, THE WORLD BANK: NEW AGENDAS IN A CHANGING WORLD 5 (1999) ("Most staff members
believe the 'approval culture' is still in place"); PAUL J. NELSON, THE WORLD BANK AND NON-
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE LIMITS OF APOLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 89 (1995) ("The
institutional tendency to define success in terms of money moved is in keeping with the tendency in
official development circles to assess the adequacy of the industrial world's aid efforts by reference to
the amounts of money or per centages of GNP devoted to the cause.")
147. Jonathan R. Pincus, State Simplification and Institution Building in Development Project, in
REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK, at 76,98 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002).
148. ADAMS, supra note 146, at 18.
149. World Bank, Portfolio Management Task Force Report Findings (1992), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/htm/opr/pmi/maintxt5.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2004).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Carol Matlack, What Happened to the Coal Miners Dollars? At Least $100 Million from a
World Bank Loan is Lost, BUS. WK., Sept. 8, 1997, at 52.
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preparing a new $500 million loan for the Russian coal sector, and Business Week
observed that "World Bank officials seem surprisingly unperturbed by the
misspending. They contend offering loans to spur change is better than
micromanaging expenditures."'
153
While the risk of default should logically provide a counter-incentive to an
overzealous "culture of lending, the risk of default is nearly inexistent in the case
of World Bank loans. All World Bank loans are guaranteed by governments,
which reduces the risk of loss for the loan to nearly zero,154 as history shows that
developing countries governments rarely default on World Bank loans.' 55 The
reasons for this phenomenon vary by country, but include the high levels of
dependence upon development assistance common in some countries, the weight
private lenders place on a country's good standing with the World Bank, the lower
interest rates and longer repayment terms countries can get from the World Bank
vis-a-vis private lenders, and the lack of access to the international capital markets
of many countries due to a below investment grade credit rating. With the risk of
default minimized to nearly zero, any significant risk to World Bank lending
decisions is removed, and a "culture of loan approval" is free to thrive, exposing
World Bank funds to higher risks of corruption. 1
56
B. The World Bank s Governance Structure
The World Bank's governance structure may also contribute to the "culture of
loan approval" and the lack of critical attention given to projects. The World Bank
is owned by Member governments who provide paid-in and callable capital in
exchange for ownership shares in the Bank. i57 Member governments benefit from
153. Id.
154. Allan H. Meltzer, et. al, Report of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission
(2000), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) ("the host
government guarantee, required by all Bank lending, eliminates any link between project failure and the
Bank's risk of loss"). In 1998, the U.S. Congress set up the International Financial Institutions Advisory
Commission, chaired by Allan Meltzer and including prominent economists, business people and
politicians, to review the usefulness of number of international financial institutions. Id. The
commission released the report in March 2000. Id.
155. See ADAMS, supra note 146, at 19 (noting that "[olver the years, a normative consensus has
formed among lending institutions and borrowing countries alike that treating the World Bank as a
preferred creditor is a central part of playing by the rules of international finance.").
156. One commentator cautions against viewing the World Bank as "simply money-pushing
institution. See Devesh Kapur, The Changing Anatomy of Governance at the World Bank, in
REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK, at 54, 71. Professor Kapur notes that the Bank's lending has leveled
off in the 1990s, except for limited bail out lending. Id. However, according to its annual report, the
IBRD increased its new lending by one billion dollars in fiscal year 2002. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note
8, at 26. The flattening in the 1990s may be more attributable to a global economic downturn beginning
in 1999 rather than the absence of an overzealous "culture of lending. It is also possible that
allegations of widespread corruption and irresponsible lending have applied pressure upon the Bank to
reduce its lending. Professor Kapur also notes that any money-pushing by the World Bank is dwarfed
by private sector lending to developing countries and that more attention should be placed on the much
larger unregulated system of international capital flows rather than the relatively small scale activity of
the World Bank. Kapur, supra note 146 at 71.
157 IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 54, at art. II.
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the business and sales generated by Bank projects and place pressure on the Bank
staff to approve more and bigger loans. 158 For example, the U.S. share in
procurement and contracting volume combined from the World Bank is twenty-
one percent.159 Governments and creditors within member countries may also push
for new loans so that developing countries can continue to service their debt.
160
These interests provide little incentive to reign in new loans and projects. Member
governments also lack the incentive to criticize the activities of other Member
governments, lest they cast a light upon their own practices.
C. Lack of and Limits to Project Oversight for Corruption
In addition to an incentive structure that promotes overly optimistic lending,
the World Bank lacks the ability to oversee all of its projects to ensure the integrity
of project funds. The World Bank requires borrowers and project implementation
entities to provide the Bank with annual independently audited financial
statements. 16 1 An investigation into World Bank management by the U.S. General
Accounting Office (GAO) in the year 2000 found that
[t]he Bank is required to approve the selection of the auditors. However, Bank
guidance on auditor selection acknowledges that it is often not possible to ensure
the independence of auditors, particularly government auditors that are used for
auditing Bank-financed projects in many countries. The Bank guidance states that
government auditors are frequently not professionally qualified accountants-
many are political appointees, and some are public service administrators.
Furthermore, the Bank has been concerned that government auditing institutions
sometimes are understaffed, underfinanced, and subject to political pressure. 16 2
In addition, audits are limited in their ability to reveal core issues of fraud and
corruption, in that business records upon which financial statements are based may
be fraudulent and left uninvestigated.
163
The scale of lending activity that the World Bank undertakes and its
geographical dispersion across the globe can create a trade-off between effective
oversight and efficiency Supervision missions to all project sites are implausible
due to cost and time constraints. The IBRD and IDA generate about 40,000
individual procurement contracts annually, of which 10,000 (60 percent of value)
undergo prior review by Bank staff.i64 The remaining 30,000 are subject to
158. Winters, supra note 9, at 122.
159 MICHAEL D.V DAVIES, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: TOP
DOWN AND BOTTOM UP 355 (2002).
160. BERTIN MARTENS ET AL., THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF FOREIGN AID 4 (2002).
161. PROGRESS SINCE 1997, supra note 7, at 8.
162. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 16.
163. Winters, supra note 9, at 116 (citing a task manager who states, "The auditors themselves-
and I've talked to a number of them--they admit freely that all they do is look at the books. If the books
balance, they say 'we've looked at it according to international auditing standards, and we find that the
records are in order. But the records themselves could be fraudulent. Auditors will tell you it's not their
job.")
164. WORLD BANK, HELPING COUNTRIES COMBAT CORRUPTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK
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selective "post-audit" review, 6 5 which is rarely camed out.166 Even in cases of
prior review, without a complaint about the procurement contract under review, it
is very difficult to find evidence of a kickback or bribe payment from the contract
itself. 167
The 2000 GAO report also found that loan appraisal documents remained
unduly optimistic. The report found that a
review of 12 projects approved after November 1998 confirmed that the Bank's
senior decision makers still have not adequately assessed the risks posed by
potential corruption and weak managerial capacity of borrowers Only 4 of the
12 projects we reviewed identified corruption or undue political interference as a
critical project risk (even as a low or negligible one), even though Bank reports
had indicated that corruption is a problem in all of the countries included in our
project sample.168
Review of a randomly selected recent loan appraisal document showed that
the Bank seems to have made minor progress in its review of corruption.'69 The
appraisal repeatedly noted the high levels of risk in procurement and financial
management as well as political risk. 70  Corruption risk was not specifically
addressed as a risk factor but was eluded to once in the appraisal, finding that an
external audit had been conducted on the main implementing agency and had
reported no misuse of the preliminary funds for the research and development of
the project.17i The Bank should consider creating a distinct component in loan
appraisal documents for corruption risk assessment, as they currently do for social
and environmental impact.172  Corruption risk should also be included in the
sensitivity analysis of the project's cost-benefit calculation, as it directly impacts
the financial outcomes of a project.
The clear inability to oversee all of its projects requires the World Bank to be
especially vigilant in its termination of corrupt employees and in its debarment of
firms. The World Bank's oversight regime has been compared to the self-
reporting tax regime of the Internal Revenue Service. 173 In such systems, probity
may only be achieved when the consequences of being caught for fraudulent
conduct are serious enough to outweigh the low probability of being caught.
174
Stronger and swifter sanctions in internal corruption proceedings, including
criminal convictions of corrupt actors, and a larger number of debarments and
terminations are necessary to achieve this outcome in World Bank projects. The
34 n.27 (1997).
165. Id.
166. Winters, supra note 9, at 119.
167. See id. at 119-20.
168. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 19-20.
169. See PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 135.
170. Id.
171. PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 135, at 96.
172. Id.
173. Winters, supra note 9, at 119.
174. See i. at 119-20.
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World Bank must also disseminate information of its successes in anti-corruption
proceedings more effectively to provide notice to governments and corrupt actors
that the penalties for corruption are severe and mounting. The recent criminal
convictions of two former World Bank employees, for example, were not publicly
disclosed by the World Bank, so any deterrent value that their convictions may
have had on other corrupt actors was lost.
D. Staff Incentives and Organizational Structure
The incentive system and the organizational structure under which World
Bank staff operates may often oppose the aims of effective corruption control.
Like any bank officer, staff members have an interest in generating new and larger
loans to further their professional prominence within the organization. 75 Due to
the difficulty in measuring the impact of loans, evaluation of staff within aid
agencies often concentrates more on the number of loans made.' 76 Staff members
also cultivate personal relationships with country representatives and may feel
pressure not to offend them or the Member government they represent.' 77 The
desire of country representatives to secure new loans combined with the staff
member's incentive to generate loans can sacrifice critical analysis of lending
decisions for corruption and other risks. 78 Rotation of staff can be used to break
personal connections and reduce corruption risk. The World Bank could consider
such a system, though it might involve a significant trade-off between anti-
corruption effectiveness and professional expertise, as regional or sector experts
are moved to new regions and sectors.
E. Sentiments Regarding Project Corruption and Development
Another obstacle to effective anti-corruption efforts is a norm voiced by some
staff members that a project with corruption is a lesser evil than no project at all. 179
By this logic, the people of a developing country are better served by a school
construction project with a fifty percent corruption rate, in which 500 out of the
required 1000 schools are built, than with no project that results in zero schools.
175. NELSON, supra note 146, at 90 ("Careers at the World Bank have long been built primarily by
designing projects that win Board approval. It is commonplace in insider discussions that staff advance
primarily by identifying, designing, negotiating and preparing projects that the Board will approve and
that further the investment program in country.").
176. ADAMS, supra note 146, at 5 ("In the development field where the criteria for success are so
long-term and uncertain, lending volume was one of the ways in which the Bank could be judged as
having an impact. As a result, the Bank's organizational culture puts premium on concluding loans,
especially large loans, and staff members have been evaluated and promoted on their success in doing
so"); see also MARTENS ET AL., supra note 160, at 4.
177 Marcus W Brauchli, Speak No Evil: Why the World Bank Failed to Anticipate Indonesia
Deep Crisis, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1998, at AI ("World Bank officials knew corruption in bank-funded
projects was common, but never commissioned any broad reports tracking how much money was lost to
it, in part, some bank officials say, because they feared having to confront the government."). See also
Rich, supra note 146, at 43 (citing World Bank internal report noting "fear of offending the client".)
178. Pincus, supra note 147.
179. Winters, supra note 9, at 120.
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One senior World Bank official is quoted as saying, "[i]f you take the amount of
30 percent loss it means 70 cents [on the dollar] got used for development after
all." 180
While logically persuasive, this proposition has been attacked as
shortsighted and naively optimistic. A task manager is cited as retorting:
.[M]y experience has been-and it's the experience of a lot of other people
there [on the operations side of the Bank]-if they're busy stealing 30 percent,
they're not paying any real attention to the other 70, even assuming 30 percent is
all they're taking. What you're really doing is really ruining the whole
effectiveness of the investment itself If you let out a contract for $2 million,
and you get the few civil servants at the top sharing $600,000 or 30 percent, do
they care if the contractor puts in concrete that is just sand and water9 Do they
care if the contractor doesn't put reinforcing steel in the structures? They don't
care. So when Bank people say we're at least getting 70 cents of good
development on the dollar, no you don't. Because the contractor either has to
make back the money that he's kicked back, or he just figures, "hey it's open
season, I do what I want and no one is going to challenge me. And so you have
this feeding frenzy, and the end result is you get very little development.
18 1
Furthermore, the notion that projects with corruption can be a "second-best"
to clean projects ignores the long-term phenomena of escalating corruption. In an
escalating corruption scenario, corrupt government officials who safely divert half
of an initial contract are emboldened to divert larger shares of subsequent contracts
until the project is reduced to simply a transfer of funds to the corrupt official, with
no project component at all. 182
This norm of overlooking corruption may be most prevalent when a nation is
experiencing rapid growth or undergoing social and economic transformations of
which the World Bank approves. In the case of Indonesia, for example, World
Bank oversight was lacking because "the World Bank considered this sprawling
archipelago's rise from poverty its great triumph."'' 83 In early 1998, World Bank
President James Wolfensohn admitted that "[w]e were caught up in the enthusiasm
of Indonesia I am not alone in thinking that 12 months ago, Indonesia was on a
very good path. ' 184 The World Bank Indonesia country head spoke of "a trade-off
between, shall we say being pure and helping people We have to decide every
morning when we wake up, are we doing more good than harm?"' 18 5 But when that
same country head visited a dozen villages looking at schools built with World
Bank funding, "[a]ll were crumbling only months after their completion, the
evident result of massive corruption that resulted in use of substandard
180. Id. at III (citing an interview with Katherine Marshall and Julian Schweitzer at World Bank
Headquarters in Washington D.C. on April 10, 1999).
181. Id. at 120.
182. Id. at 11, 120.
183. Brauchli, supra note 177
184. Id.
185. Id.
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materials,"1 8 6 confirming the critique offered above that development usually does
not occur in such corrupt projects. 187
The incidence of this norm among World Bank staff members is difficult to
measure. While one can assume that most staff members are committed to the
goals of anti-corruption, one cannot simply assume that most staff members would
support wholly canceling many development projects because of corruption. Any
tolerance of corruption based on this notion of a "second-best" remains an obstacle
to effective corruption-fighting in the World Bank.
F Political Considerations in Lending
Political and foreign policy considerations often shape the lending decisions
of the World Bank and lead to an overlooking of corruption risk. Throughout its
history, the lending decisions of the World Bank have often followed the political
and foreign policy aims of its largest shareholder, the United States. These
external considerations explain the World Bank's decisions not to lend to Vietnam
in the 1970s and 1980s, not to lend to Iran in the 1980s and 1990s, and to reduce
lending to India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests in 199 8 .i 88 During the Cold
War, political allies of the U.S., including Indonesia, Turkey Mexico, Congo, and
the Philippines continually received World Bank funding despite widespread
corruption, repeated noncompliance with loan provisions, and political
instability i89 Most recently, the World Bank provided funding to reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan and is now being looked upon for funding in the Iraqi
reconstruction effort, despite the lack of any reliable civil authorities in either
locale. 190 These reconstruction efforts are also current cornerstones in American
foreign policy efforts. The link between World Bank lending and political and
foreign policy objectives of leading shareholders will continue to pose a risk to the
integrity of World Bank loan funds.
All of these factors help explain why the World Bank has been reluctant to
make long-term commitments to cut off funding for countries in the face of
evidence of widespread corruption or of a generally corrupt business environment.
The case of Kenya provides an illustrative example. In 1997 the World Bank
suspended a $72 million dollar loan to Kenya, together with an IMF suspension of
$220 million in loans, in the face of endemic corruption. i9 Despite the clear
186. Id.
187. Winters, supra note 9, at 11I, 120.
188. Kapur, supra note 156, at 59-60.
189. Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, in REINVENTING THE
WORLD BANK, at 1, 5-6 (citing Catherine Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, 1945-1992, in 2
THE WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 195, 252-63 (Kapur et al. eds., 1997)).
190. World Bank, New World Bank Grants Worth US $90 Million Reach Out Across Afghanistan,
June 6, 2002, at http://web.worldbank.org/ World Bank, World Bank Supports International
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, Oct. 22, 2003, at http://web.worldbank.org/
191. Pamphil Kweyuh, Kenya-Economy: World Bank Stops US$71.6 Energy Project, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Aug. 13, 1997. See also Thomas Omestad, et al., Bye-bye to Bribes: The Industrial World
Takes Aim at Official Corruption, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP Dec. 22, 1997, at 39.
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failure of Daniel Arap Moi's administration to tackle corruption in Kenya-it
made a number of public and administrative gestures-the World Bank resumed
lending shortly thereafter, only to suspend loans again in December 2000.'192
Only a month after a new president, Mwai Kibaki, took office in December
2002 pledging to curb corruption, the World Bank announced it would again
resume lending as early as July 2003 if the government implemented measures
demanded by IMF donors. 193 The Kenyan government launched a serious public
effort to combat corruption, creating an anti-corruption commission and a new
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, appomting the head of Transparency
International in Kenya to a senior governmental position overseeing public ethics
and integrity forcing the resignation of the notoriously corrupt former Chief
Justice, and requiring that all public officials disclose their wealth-with the
President being the first to do so.194
The World Bank, however, did not require an actual reduction in the level of
corruption nor did it conduct any assessments of changes in corruption levels or
risk since the inauguration of the Kibaki government. The outcome of the current
prosecution of the chief project director involved in the Kenyan road scandal that
led to the U.S. convictions of two World Bank employees last year is still
pending. 195 The Kibaki administration has not made any progress on World Bank
demands that other top officials and contractors involved in that scandal be
prosecuted and banned from future government tenders. 196 Kenyan Attorney
General Amos Wako even cautioned recently that "the culture of corruption is
deeply rooted and efforts to stop it might become entangled in political
wrangling."' 197 If the political will of the Kibaki government to fight corruption
withers or runs into any major obstacles, the World Bank could find itself
suspending lending for a third time.
The Kenyan government has also made promising developmental reforms in
its first one-hundred days, beyond its anti-corruption reforms, by introducing
universal free primary education, launching a scheme to restructure the financial
system to benefit the agricultural backbone of the Kenyan economy building up
strategic grain reserves to forestall food shortages, and passing a number of anti-
crime measures that have reduced the crime rate in half across the country 198 For
the World Bank, any risk of corruption seems to be outweighed by the need to
support the developmental goals of the administration. The Kenyan case reveals
that the notion of tolerating corruption risk when the broader development policies
or practices of the country are favorable to the World Bank is still present.
192. See Gus Selassie, World Bank to Resume Development Assistance to Kenya, WORLD
MARKETS RES. CENTRE DAILY ANALYSIS, Jan. 30, 2003.
193. Id.
194. U.S. Diplomat Highlights Kenya Actions Against Corruption and Terrorism, ALL AFR.,
Sept. 13, 2003; Kibaki, Cabinet Declare Wealth, ALL AFR., Sept. 30, 2003.
195. Kevin Kelley, Two Swedes Jailed over Bribes in Kenyan Deal, ALL AFR., Feb. 6, 2004.
196. Corruption Watch World Bank Kenya Counter Attacks, APR. ANALYSIS, May 8, 2002.
197. Press Releases and Documents, Voice of Amenca, Kenya/Corruption (July 24, 2003).
198. Yu Xinchao, Opportunities, Challenges Coexist in Reconstruction of Kenya, XINHUA NEWS
AGENCY, Apr. 14, 2003.
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G. Incentives for Firms and Contractors
Firms and contractors who are hired by the World Bank or by governments to
participate in World Bank financed projects can lack the proper incentives to report
corruption to the World Bank. The World Bank currently does not have a
provision that allows internal investigators to offer immunity to firms who assist in
corruption investigations. So, a firm that has paid bribes to a government official
in a World Bank financed project faces debarment if it comes forward with
allegations against the government official. If the firm has not engaged in
corrupt activity but is aware of corruption, it may still not come forward out of a
fear of losing future World Bank or government contracts. The creation of an
anonymous hotline to report corrupt activity may mitigate the risk to whistleblower
firms and contractors, but may not provide enough protection in the minds of some
contractors to overcome the fear of retaliation in the bidding process for future
projects.
H. The Status of the Internal Investigative Body
Another serious structural problem threatening the World Bank's anti-
corruption efforts is the precarious status of the internal investigative body within
the World Bank bureaucracy 199 In bureaucratic structures, internal investigations
bodies tend to be viewed with reservations if not outright distrust. The World
Bank Tribunal in C v. IBRD implied such a suspicion when it wrote that the
internal investigative body performed in an "unnecessarily secretive" manner that
violated the due process rights of employees. 20 0 The Tribunal has found due
process defects in a number of other investigations. 20 1 These cases affirm the fears
of some staff members that the work of the internal investigations department
oversteps its authority and illegitimately intrudes into their employment
relationship with the Bank. The fact that the Department of Institutional Integrity
is an independent body accountable only to the President of the Bank heightens the
distrust some within the Bank feel towards it.
The creation of an internal investigations body for the World Bank follows
from the World Bank's Articles of Agreement, which includes a provision stating,
"the Bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loan are
used only for the purposes for which the loan was granted., 20 2 The World Bank has
199. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 12 (observing that the investigations Unit did not have the
necessary stature within the World Bank).
200. See C v. IBRD, Decision No. 272, at 26 (World Bank Admin. Trib. 2002).
201. See Koudogbo v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., Decision No. 246, at 14, 43
(World Bank Admin. Trib. 2001). See also Dambita v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev.,
Decision No. 243, at 9 26, 28 (World Bank Admin. Trib. 2001); Cisse v. Int'l Bank for Reconstruction
and Dev., Decision No. 242, at 37, 43 (World Bank Admin. Trib. 2001). It is important to note that
these decisions were decided when the internal investigative process was fragmented, prior to the
creation of unified Department of Institutional Integrity. This new structure allegedly increases the
Bank's system of checks and balances over the procedures of the internal investigations unit.
202. IBRD Articles of Agreement, supra note 54, at art. Ill § 5.
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not formally established the Department of Institutional Integrity with an
Executive Board order, as the United Nations has done with its internal
investigations body through United Nations General Assembly resolution
48/218.203 Approving a World Bank Executive Board order would bolster the
organizational legitimacy of the investigations unit and would also establish the
office permanently, removing any threat to its continued operation.
1. Recommendations for Addressing Structural Obstacles
A number of recommendations have already been offered in this paper to
address some of the structural obstacles detailed above. These include issuing an
Executive Board order formally establishing the World Bank's internal anti-
corruption unit, providing the option of immunity from debarment to firms who
come forward with allegations of corruption, rotating project staff more frequently,
publicizing criminal referrals and other punitive measures against corrupt firms
and individuals more widely to bolster the deterrence value of such activities,
analyzing corruption risk as a distinct component in project appraisals and
including corruption risk in the sensitivity analysis of the cost-benefit calculations
of proposed projects.
Recommendations to address the serious challenges of the World Bank's
operational model and governance have also been widely offered in the public
domain. Some have recommended that the World Bank dramatically reduce its
level of lending "until the quality of administration and supervision in projects,
both on the Bank's part and on the borrower's side, is improved to a degree that
the resources are not squandered. 20 4
The Meltzer Commission Report draws a starker conclusion, calling for the
elimination of all lending to countries with investment grade credit ratings. 20 5 The
Commission recommends that loans to poor countries without access to capital
markets should still be made but for institutional reform and that developmental
aid should be aimed at public goods like health care and should be administered
through performance based grants rather than loans.2 6 The Meltzer Commission
included some prominent dissenting members who attacked the Commission's
recommendations as potentially threatening the fight against global poverty 207
They questioned the Commission s recommendation to limit the nonconcessional
lending of the IDA branch of the World Bank, which extends interest-free loans to
203. See G.A. Res. 48/218B, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 87th mig., U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/218, at art.
11, 9 (1994).
204. Winters, supra note 9, at 122-23 (Winters finds task managers who agree with him, such as
one who concludes: "We're long way from turning the comer on the Bank s culture. There will not be
real progress until there's genuine slowing down of the lending program.")
205. Meltzer, supra note 154.
206. Id.
207. Id. (dissenting statement of C. Fred Bergsten, Director, Institute for International Economics;
Richard Huber, Former Chairman, President, and CEO, Aetna, Inc., Jerome Levinson, Former General
Counsel, Inter-American Development Bank; and Esteban Torres, U.S. House of Representatives,
1983-99).
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the poorest countries of the world.208 They also questioned the commitment of
Western governments to fund a grant-giving agency after the lending capital of the
World Bank is returned to Western governments per the Commission's
recommendations.209 Finally, they feared the impact on developing countries of
being forced to rely on international capital markets, which may be volatile.2 10
The World Bank had already undertaken one of the Meltzer Commission
proposals, by aggressively pursuing capacity-building in developing countries to
create the type of procurement, managerial and legal institutions necessary to
ensure the integrity of its funds. 211 The Overview of World Bank Activities in
Fiscal 2002 noted that "[p]ublic administration was by far the leading sector for
IBRD lending, receiving $3.6 billion, over 30 percent of the total. The significant
amount of lending in the public administration sector reflects the Bank's focus on
assisting its clients to improve development strategies, implement reform policies,
and build institutional capacities.' '2i2
The movement towards institutional reform should proceed with caution. In
the past, the use of economic aid as a tool for policy reforms has been mixed in its
success and is a controversial and contentious topic. 213 In addition, the World Bank
has espoused dramatically different patterns of thinking in the realm of
institutional development over the past thirty years that should cast doubt on its
knowledge base in governance reforms.214 Furthermore, there is no accepted
institutional formula for reducing corruption within countries and the tremendous
variation between countries requires customized and local political solutions.
215
For these reasons, the World Bank should foster greater policy dialogue within
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. PROGRESS SINCE 1997, supra note 7, at 44.
212. World Bank, Overview of World Bank Activities in Fiscal 2002, at
http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport/2002/Overview.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004)
213. WHITE & DIJKSTRA, supra note 146, at 518 (for detailed analysis of the history and
controversies related to aid conditionality with case studies of conditionality programs). See also
WORLD BANK, ASSESSING AID 4 (1998) (The World Bank's own analysis of policy-based aid shows
"that donor financing with strong conditionality but without strong domestic leadership and political
support has generally failed to produce lasting change.").
214. See ADAMS, supra note 146, at 108 (describing the World Bank's view on state involvement
in economic development as swinging pendulum over the past four decades). See also WHITE &
DIJKSTRA, supra note 146, at 518.
215. See generally Mushtaq H. Khan, Corruption and Governance in Early Capitalism: World
Bank Strategies and Their Limitations, in REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK, supra note 146, at 164,
181-83 (proposing that the World Bank's anti-corruption prescriptions are founded on misguided
assumption that reducing the discretionary role of the State will promote growth. Instead, the historical
evidence attests to the fact that all developed nations have undergone a period during which State
intervention supported the interests of an emergent capitalist class at the expense of other classes. What
separates the underdeveloped from the developed is that in the latter, the State had the political capacity
to reign in the capitalist class to ensure that preferential disparate treatment did not become oriented
towards the capture of State resources. The key, then, is not to "nght-size" underdeveloped States with
reforms that reduce their discretion, but to allow discretion and preferential treatment while supporting
political reforms to ensure that political leadership can control the emergent capitalist class once it
begins to thrive.)
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developing countries about the power structures that foster and maintain corruption
and how to diffuse power so that citizens may more easily hold their governments
accountable for corruption.2 16 For this reason, any anti-corruption governance
reforms should be devised in collaboration with civil society and the population at
large in developing countries.
A reasonable compromise between the viewpoints in the current debate on
fundamental World Bank reform may be a viable avenue to follow The Bank has
not sufficiently addressed concerns about its culture of overly optimistic lending
decisions. A recent $46 million urban revitalization loan to Brazil attests to the
continuing culture of lending optimism at the World Bank.217 The loan appraisal
document identified an overall project risk rating of "substantial. 2 8 The appraisal
rated the risk associated with the project's implementing agency as "high, noting
"[w]eak management and technical capacity of the executing [agencies'
coordination of the project] (FIDEM and Municipalities), particularly in the areas
of procurement and financial management., 219 The loan appraisal did mention risk
mitigation strategies which included hiring numerous technical consultants to
assist the implementing agency and numerous World Bank supervisory visits."' In
spite of these measures, the World Bank should reconsider lending to projects with
"substantial" overall risk ratings in which the primary weaknesses is in the main
implementing agency Reducing lending to such risky projects might not
necessarily produce an overall reduction in World Bank lending, as funding for
safer projects and anti-corruption reform might be increased.
In the interim, as the World Bank addresses these larger institutional
questions, it should ensure that its own internal investigations unit is properly
financed and trained and has the proper legal framework within which to function.
This framework would include the reforms related to the recent C v. IBRD opinion
discussed above, the enactment of an illicit enrichment provision, a clear and
effective standard of proof, and the ability to share information with other agencies
and cross-debar. Increased public recognition of their efforts and an Executive
Board order formally recognizing their existence as a mandated institution under
the Bank's Articles of Agreement will also help to promote the stature of the
internal investigations unit while increasing the deterrent value of their work. The
internal investigative bodies should also provide training to national prosecutors in
developing countries to help prosecute corrupt firms and individuals the World
216. Some critics argue that the Bank's technical solutions to corruption overlook the power
arrangements in all corrupt client countries that allow certain actors in society to flout formal rules for
their personal benefit. Winters, supra note 9, at 113. The Bank itself admitted in its 1997 anti-
corruption Framework that, "[i]n some countries the primary reason for divergence [from formal rules]
may be political, a manifestation of the way power is exercised and retained. This limits what the Bank
can do to help outside the framework of its projects. PROGRESS SINCE 1997, supra note 7 at 13.
217 World Bank, World Bank Approves $46 Million for Low-Income Urban Upgrading in
Northeast Brazil, Apr. 24, 2003, at http://web.worldbank.org/.
218. The possible risk ratings were "high, "substantial, "modest, and "negligible or low.
PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT, supra note 135, at 50-51.
219. Id. at 51.
220. See generally id.
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Bank refers to them. Funding and training should also be provided to investigators
and prosecutors in developing countries to help build corruption cases related to
World Bank loans.
V CONCLUSION
In the face of a wealth of research on the debilitating effects of corruption in
developing countries and mounting evidence of endemic corruption in World Bank
projects, the World Bank announced an institutional commitment to curbing
corruption in its projects m 1996.221 Since then, the World Bank has launched a
multi-pronged strategy to attempt to ensure the integrity of the projects it finances
throughout the developing world. Nearly a decade later, the World Bank's anti-
corruption efforts are continuing to develop in concert with a growing international
effort to curb corruption. However, serious legal and structural uncertainties and
obstacles stand in the way of full effectiveness of the World Bank's efforts.
Expansive due process rights of employees in criminal referrals, an uncertain
standard of proof in internal corruption investigations, no system of investigative
cooperation and cross-debarment, and a series of fundamental structural
impediments pose significant threats to the success of the World Bank's anti-
corruption efforts. Substantive reforms ranging from a new Staff Rule ensuring
secrecy during criminal referrals to the formal calculation of corruption risk in loan
appraisal documents offer realistic ways to strengthen the anti-corruption efforts of
the World Bank. Unless these necessary internal legal and structural reforms are
undertaken, the integrity of all World Bank projects will be uncertain at best,
imperiling the future of the broader global development project itself.
221. World Bank, News, Issue Briefs, Corruption, at http://web.worldbank.org/ (last visited Feb. 8,
2004).
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